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Abstract 
Maintenance errors are known to be a key cause of aviation mishaps and the search for their 
causes is now given high priority in the aviation industry. In parallel with the search for causes, 
research efforts are also focusing on the ways in which various background factors link together 
to influence safety outcomes. The present study set out to validate a structural model wherein 
psychological strain is depicted as a major contributor to maintenance errors through the direct 
influence of strain on maintenance errors and also via its role as a mediator of the effects of 
safety climate on errors. The Maintenance Environment Survey (MES: Fogarty, 2004) was 
administered to 150 personnel responsible for maintenance of a large military helicopter fleet. 
Structural equation modeling was then used to test the fit of the mediation model. The findings 
support claims that the effect of safety climate on errors is at least partially mediated by 
individual level factors, such as psychological strain. In our efforts to secure better safety 
outcomes, we should therefore maintain a dual focus on organizational and individual level 
variables. Regular administration of safety climate and psychological health surveys can help to 
achieve this aim.      
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Psychological Strain Mediates the Impact of Impact of Safety Climate on Aviation Maintenance 
Errors 
 The growing literature on safety climate and the proliferation of instruments designed to 
measure safety climate (see Wiegmann, von Thaden, Mitchell, Sharma, & Zhang, 2003) point to 
the importance of organisational variables as background causes of error. The various error 
taxonomies used throughout the aviation industry (e.g., HFACS: Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997) 
emphasise the role of organisational as well as individual variables. From a more general 
perspective, following Reason’s (1990) seminal publication on the bases of human error, 
descriptive models of accident causation suggest that individuals err because of latent 
organisational pathogens that create conditions wherein human weaknesses are unnecessarily  
exposed. Within the context of human error, it is now generally acknowledged that it is the 
interaction of organisational and individual variables that lead to error.  
 Having reached this point, researchers must turn their attention to teasing out the nature 
of this interaction. Structural equation modelling (SEM), a technique that combines factor 
analysis with regression analysis, is well-suited to this purpose because of its ability to 
accommodate both organizational climate and individual differences approaches. The present 
study employed SEM to cross-validate a structural model reported in Fogarty (2004) that depicts 
organisational factors as impacting on psychological health, which in turn impacts on 
maintenance errors. The rationale for the model is spelled out in the earlier publication. What 
follows here is a brief summary of the relevant literature and a description of the parts of the 
model that are to be tested in the present study.  
 Most safety climate studies have relied on regression techniques and bivariate 
correlations to demonstrate the existence of a relationship between safety climate and safety 
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performance without attempting to explain the bases of the observed correlations. However, a 
small group of studies outside the aviation domain have used path analysis or SEM to address 
this issue. Two of these studies are of particular interest in the context of the present validation 
study. In the first of these, Tomas, Melia, and Oliver (1999) employed path analysis to examine 
the effect of safety climate on accidents. Contrary to their expectations, safety climate did not 
have a direct effect on workers’ safety behavior. Instead, organizational variables influenced 
group processes (supervisors’ and co-workers’ safety response), “which in turn influenced 
workers’ safety attitudes and behaviors, usually reported as the ‘main’ direct cause of accidents” 
(p.57).   
 In a second study, Oliver, Cheyne, Tomas, and Cox (2002) collected data from a wide 
range of industrial sectors in the Valencia region of Spain using structured interviews and 
employed SEM to test models depicting the influence of organizational and individual variables 
on accidents. They found that individual level variables, including safe behavior and general 
health, mediated the indirect effects of the organizational variables. Stress, in particular, was an 
important mediator of both organizational and environmental variables. 
 Working within an aviation maintenance context, Fogarty (2004) found support for a 
structural model that showed organizational factors influencing individual factors such as 
psychological health and morale, which in turn had an impact on self-reported workplace errors 
and job turnover intentions. Specifically, organizational factors accounted for 67% of the 
variance in a construct called Morale and 44% of the variance in a construct called 
(psychological) Health. The organizational variables did not have a direct effect on Errors or Job 
Intentions but they did have a significant indirect effect through Morale and Health. Morale, 
Fatigue, and Health, between them, accounted for 45% of self-reported maintenance errors and 
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27% of turnover intentions. The Fogarty (2004) study therefore supports the findings of these 
other researchers and demonstrates the relevance of the findings to the aviation industry. 
However, because the data were cross-sectional in nature and drawn from a single sample, it is 
important that the structural model developed by Fogarty be cross-validated. If it can be 
established that the primary influence of organizational variables is on the psychological health 
of the individual worker, rather than on errors per se, and if it can be established that individual 
factors have a direct link with errors, then we will have a better idea of the likely efficacy of 
interventions directed at different parts of the error chain. The primary purpose of the present 
study was to attempt this cross validation. 
  To provide the full context for the present study, the Fogarty (2004) model is reproduced 
in Figure 1. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 For the purposes of the present study, the key parts of this model are those linking 
Climate with Health and Errors. Morale was included in the earlier study as a predictor of 
turnover intentions and it also made a contribution to the prediction of maintenance errors. 
However, both morale and turnover intentions are omitted in the present cross-validation study 
which was concerned primarily with the construct of psychological strain and its direct impact on 
errors and its role as a mediator of the effects of safety climate. In this model (see Figure 2) 
Recognition, Safety Focus, Supervision, Feedback, and Training were treated as aggregate 
variables (Gribbons & Hocevar, 1998) serving as reflective indicators of an underlying construct 
labelled Safety Climate (the same construct labeled as Climate in the earlier study). Stress and 
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GHQ were also treated as aggregate variables serving as reflective indicators of an underlying 
construct called Psychological Strain. Errors was treated as a single indicator latent trait that 
forms the main outcome in this study. In accordance with standard SEM practice (Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 1989), the factor loading of the single indicator was set to 1.0 and the residual variance 
is set to (1-reliability)*variance. Finally, Psychological Strain is conceptualized as a variable that 
entirely mediates the influence of Safety Climate on Errors . 
 A competing model with a direct link between Safety Climate and Errors was also tested 
on the grounds that a significant direct pathway would rule out the possibility of full mediation.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 150 maintenance engineers (146 males) working at a major helicopter repair 
base for the Australian Army responded to the survey, representing a response rate of over 92%. 
The survey was targeted primarily at trainees (36.7%), tradespersons (33.3%) and supervisors 
(30%). The average age of the respondents was 30.5 years and most respondents (82.4%) had 
been working as a maintenance engineer or a trainee engineer for at least one year.  
Materials 
 
A slightly modified version of the Maintenance Environment Survey (MES: Fogarty, 
2004) was used to measure safety climate. Modifications consisted of an additional item for the 
Supervision scale, a reduction of three items for the Training Standards scale, and an increase of 
nine items in the Error scale. The scales are described below under the headings of the constructs 
for which they were intended to act as markers. The Cronbach alpha internal consistency 
reliability estimates obtained from the present study are reported for each scale.  
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A. Safety Climate (MES scales) 
1. Recognition for doing good work (5 items). This scale assessed the extent to which people feel 
that they are rewarded and recognised for doing good work. Sample item: In this job, 
people are rewarded according to performance. Alpha = .78. 
2. Safety focus of the organization (5 items). This scale assessed the perception that the 
organisation has a strong concern for safety issues. Sample item: This unit regards safety 
as a major factor in achieving its goals. Alpha = .72. 
3. Supervision standards (7 items). The items in this scale focused on the expertise of the 
supervisor and the extent to which the supervisor assisted the worker. Sample item: My 
immediate supervisor really understands the maintenance task. Alpha = .86. 
4. Feedback on work performance (4 items). These items assessed workers’ perceptions of the 
amount and quality of feedback they received. Sample item: The quality of our work is 
rated or evaluated frequently. Alpha = .73. 
5. Training standards and appropriateness (5 items). The items in this scale covered a number of 
different aspects of training, including adequacy of training for the job, encouragement to 
undertake further training, and opportunities for on-the-job training. Sample item: My 
training and experience have prepared me well for the duties of my current job. Alpha = 
.62. 
B. Psychological Strain (MES plus GHQ) 
 6. Exposure to workplace stressors (9 items). The questions comprising this scale tapped the 
actual feelings and consequences of stress, rather than background factors that might be 
causing the strain. Sample item: I get anxious when I work to strict deadlines. Alpha = 
.84.  
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7. Health. The abbreviated, 12-item form of the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ: Goldberg 
and Williams, 1988) was used. The GHQ explores four aspects of psychological health: 
somatic symptoms; anxiety and insomnia; social dysfunction; and severe depression. 
High scores indicate poor psychological health. Alpha = .88. 
C. Outcome Variable (MES) 
8. Maintenance errors (13 items). The revised MES included 13 questions that asked the 
respondents to indicate whether they made maintenance errors on the job. These included 
errors that they detected themselves and those picked up by their supervisors. Sample 
item: I make errors in my job from time to time. Alpha = .82. 
All items, except for those involving the GHQ and the PANAS scales, employed a five-
point (1-5) Likert scale format where 1 indicated strong agreement and 5 strong disagreement. 
High scores on all Safety Climate variables were desirable whilst low scores were regarded as 
desirable on Stress, GHQ, and Errors. [A copy of the version of MES used in this study can be 
found at http://www.usq.edu.au/users/fogarty/]  
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that followed by Fogarty (2004). The survey was 
sponsored by Army Aviation Headquarters and survey forms were included in the pay envelopes 
of all maintenance personnel along with a covering letter explaining the purposes of the survey. 
To ensure anonymity, self-addressed envelopes were included so that the forms could be 
returned directly to the investigator. At the completion of the study, feedback sessions on the 
main findings of the study were conducted by the investigator and a research assistant. 
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Results  
All scales, except for Training, had satisfactory reliability estimates with alpha estimates 
above .70 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). The low reliability of the Training scale (.62) was not 
of concern given that it acted as just one of five markers for the Safety Climate construct. It 
could also be argued that the components of a training program are not necessarily correlated and 
should therefore be treated as an index rather than a scale (see Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer, 
2001). SPSS (version 11.0.1) was used to calculate means, standard deviations, and scale 
intercorrelations.  The results are shown in Table 1. 
Summary Statistics and Correlations for MES Scales (N = 150) 
Scale M SD Correlations 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Recognition 2.90  .52  
2. Safety Focus 3.58  .60 .25  
3. Supervision 3.59  .61 .32 .23  
4. Feedback 2.99  .48 .46 .29 .43  
5. Training 3.07  .64 .32 .29 .36 .52  
6. Stress 3.05  .59 -.32 -.36 -.20 -.31 -.32  
7. GHQ 1.94  .46 -.40 -.30 -.21 -.37 -.35 .60  
8. Errors 2.57  .57 -.05 -.27 -.06 -.09 -.11 .34 .25 
 
Note. Correlations above ± .18 are significant at the .01 level
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The bottom row of Table 1 shows the correlations of the Errors scale with all other 
scales. It can be seen that the only significant correlations involving Errors were with Safety 
Focus, a Safety Climate marker, and the two Psychological Strain variables, Stress and GHQ. It 
can also be seen that the Safety Climate variables were all correlated with both of the 
Psychological Strain markers. These findings support those reported by Fogarty (2004) and are 
in keeping with the proposition that safety climate acts primarily on the psychological health of 
the individual workers and that psychological strain is a primary determinant of maintenance 
errors. This proposition is tested in the next section by using path analysis.  
Maximum likelihood procedures from Version 5.0 of the AMOS structural equation 
modelling (SEM) package (Arbuckle, 2003) were employed to test the hypothesized model of 
the relations among the MES variables. Because of the unfavourable ratio of free parameters to 
cases, a partially aggregated model (Gribbons & Hocevar, 1998) was used wherein subscales 
represented the various first-order constructs in the conceptual model. Three fit indices are 
reported. The first is the traditional  χ2 goodness of fit test where p values above .05 can be taken 
to indicate good fit. One incremental fit index was used; the comparative fit index (CFI: Bentler, 
1990) which is considered to be reasonably robust against violations of assumptions and where a 
value above .95 was considered to indicate satisfactory fit. The third index used was the root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA: Steiger, 1990), which indicates the mean 
discrepancy between the observed covariances and those implied by the model per degree of 
freedom, and therefore has the advantage of being sensitive to model complexity. A value of .05 
or lower indicates a good fit and values up to .08 indicate an acceptable fit (Kline, 1998). 
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A test of the path model shown in Figure 2 yielded acceptable fit indices with χ2 (19, N = 
150) = 23.29, p = .23; CFI = .98; RMSEA = .04. The model predicted 39% of the variance in 
Psychological Strain 15% of the variance in Errors. All factor loadings and regression pathways 
were significant. A second model with a pathway from Safety Climate to Errors was also fitted. 
However there was no improvement in model fit and the direct pathway was not significant. 
Accordingly, the more parsimonious model is the preferred solution. 
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Figure 1.  Fogarty’s (2004) model depicting interactions among Climate, Morale, Health, Fatigue, Turnover, and 
Errors 
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Figure 2.  Model depicting interactions among Safety Climate, Psychological Strain, and Errors 
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Discussion 
The main aim of the present study was to test Fogarty’s (2004) proposition that the link 
between safety climate and errors is mediated by psychological health and to confirm the 
important role of psychological strain in particular as being among the immediate causes of 
maintenance errors. The study was successful in these aims. The bivariate correlations reveal a 
significant association between safety climate and psychological strain and a further significant 
association between psychological strain and maintenance errors. The path model establishes that 
the linkage between safety climate and errors is a mediated one.  
These results replicate the Fogarty (2004) findings and support claims by researchers 
working in other high risk industries (Oliver et al., 2002; Tomas et al., 1999) that organizational 
and individual level variables cannot be regarded as having additive effects on safety 
performance. As other researchers have asserted, many errors result from interacting causes 
involving physical, cognitive, social, and organizational factors. To understand this interaction 
requires a model of how the components of the system work together to influence outcomes. The 
model tested in the current research program is conceptually driven and already validated on a 
military population (Fogarty, 2004). Its cross-validation in the present study suggests that we 
have a way of measuring and quantifying some of the main sources of error.    
The implications of these findings are spelled out in Fogarty (2004) but I will summarise 
them again here. The demonstration of indirect links between climate and errors (via 
psychological strain) suggests that the mere presence of unfavourable perceptions of 
organizational factors is not sufficient in itself to lead to errors. Unfavourable organizational 
conditions place pressure on the individual and when the individual begins to succumb to these 
pressures, errors begin to occur. From a management perspective, it is therefore important to 
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monitor both safety climate and individual health variables on a regular basis to ensure that there 
are no problems of this kind developing. Studies such as the present one therefore lend strong 
support to initiatives designed to measure climate and individual health (e.g., Wiegmann et al., 
2003; Cival Aviation Authority, 2003). Such measures will be even more useful if benchmark 
comparisons within and across organizations become possible (Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2001). 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
In closing, it is important to recognize the theoretical and methodological shortcomings 
of the approach followed in the original Fogarty (2004) study and, hence, in the present 
validation study. From a theoretical point of view, it could be argued that the set of markers used 
for Safety Climate in the present study was not truly representative of the safety climate 
construct and that a different set of variables may define a factor that is directly related to errors. 
The earlier paper justifies the selection of marker variables but it is certainly true that this 
proposition needs to be tested. The fact that Safety Focus was correlated with Errors in the 
present study (r = -.27, p <  .01) is an indication that some aspects of climate may have a direct 
relationship with errors. In ongoing research, we are extending the error scale in an attempt to 
capture the various dimensions of this construct and to search for evidence of direct links 
between organizational variables and specific types of error. 
A further limitation of the current research program is that it is confined to the military 
environment. Maintenance engineers working in this setting face some challenges (e.g., demands 
of military duties) that are not faced by those working in commercial settings. The converse also 
holds true. It is also possible that military settings impose a uniformity of working conditions not 
found in the commercial environment. If safety climate is reasonably uniform throughout an 
organization such as Army Aviation, the consequent restriction in range will have the effect of 
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suppressing correlations with other variables. The model therefore needs to be tested in different 
organizational settings. Against this criticism, it must be noted that there was sufficient 
variability in the safety climate construct in both of these studies to enable it to account for a 
significant proportion of the variance in psychological health.  
Conclusion 
There is also still much work to be done in identifying the contributors to both 
psychological health and errors. The restricted model tested in the present study explained 15% 
of the variance in errors. The Fogarty (2004) study included morale and fatigue as additional 
predictors and succeeded in capturing 45% of the variance in errors. The aim of the present study 
was to clarify the pathways by which organizational and psychological variables contribute to 
errors, rather than to maximize the prediction, but we should not lose sight of the fact that both 
aims are important. When the predictor space has been well defined using these self-report 
measures of error, the challenge will then be to see if these findings can be applied to real-life 
measures of error gathered in actual work settings. A growing number of studies examining the 
relationship between psychological variables such as stress and actual accident data (e.g., 
Fogarty & Shardlow, 2004; Hoffman & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 2000) suggest that this will be the 
case and that we already have a good platform for designing interventions that will assist in error 
reduction.  
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